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1 Introduction.
Recent decades have witnessed an increasing share of the level of spending on
health care relative to the GDP (see OECD, 2005a,b). There is a general consen-
sus that technological development (and diffusion) is a prime driver of this phe-
nomenon. The recent account by Smith et al. (2009) estimates that 27-48% of
growth in the US health spending (1960-2007) is due to medical technology. De-
spite the relatively large literature documenting empirically the innovation in health
care, theory has not been fully developed. In this paper we address a particular is-
sue: the role of payment systems to the rate of technology adoption.
We contribute to the theoretical literature by setting up a model of uncertain
demand, where the technological shift is driven by the increased benefit for pa-
tients, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. We seek
to assess the impact of the payment system to providers on the rate of technology
adoption. We propose two payment schemes, a reimbursement according to the
cost of treating patients, and a DRG payment system where the new technology
may or may not be reimbursed differently from the old technology. We find that
under a cost reimbursement system, large enough patient benefits are necessary for
adoption to occur. However, when the DRG contemplates a higher reimbursement
for new technology, sufficiently large patient benefits are a sufficient condition for
technology adoption to exist. In the absence of patient benefits, the margin gained
with the new DRG associated with treatment with the new technology must be suf-
ficiently high to compensate the cost of adoption. Finally, to compare the levels of
technological adoption, we identify the values of the relevant parameters that for
a given investment level, yield to the provider the same marginal return of invest-
ment in new capacity across regimes. Cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption
of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of
new vs. old DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the
cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under
both payment systems.
The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the literature addressing
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the impact of technological progress on health care expenditures from a number of
different perspectives.
In general, the main findings can be grouped in three related items: (i) techno-
logical development induces an increase in health care expenditures, (ii) the reim-
bursement system in the health care sector has an impact on the R&D effort, and
(iii) the R&D effort determines the type of technological development, either brand
new technology, or improvements in existing technology (or both). Some of the
main conclusions of this mainly empirical literature stress the fact that (i) prospec-
tive payment systems encourage cost efficient new technologies but have perverse
effects on quality improvement, and (ii) retrospective payment systems encourage
quality but dim sensitivity toward cost efficiency. Di Tommaso and Schweitzer
(2005) collect a series of papers to describe the benefits of promoting a country’s
health industry as a way to stimulate its high-technology industrial capacity.
According to the OECD (2005c), to understand the economic consequences of
technological change it is necessary to know “... whether the new technologies sub-
stitute for old or are add-ons to existing diagnostic and treatment approaches, (...)
whether these technologies are cost reducing. cost neutral, or cost effective, [and]
what the target population is” (p.28). As clear-cut as these questions may look,
they do not always lead to a simple answer. It may well occur that a technologi-
cal change allows for reducing the average cost, improving quality, and reducing
risk to patients. However, such technology would also allow for an expansion of
the population of patients suitable for such technology, thus inducing an increase
in the overall health care budget. Key determinants of the technological change
in health care systems (see OECD, 2005c: 31-38) are (i) the relationship between
health care expenditures and GDP; (ii) the reimbursement arrangements in the in-
surance contracts, and (iii) the regulatory environment.
Bodenheimer (2005) finds evidence linking tight budget controls to slower
technological advance “... but eventually [technological advance] drives costs up.
The imperative to innovate overcomes the effort to economize.” (p. 936).
In a fascinating paper, Weisbrod (1991) explains the interaction between the
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R&D effort and the health care insurance system as the result of the combination
of two arguments. The first one tells us that health care expenditures are driven
by technical innovation, which in turn, is the result of the R&D processes, which
are determined by the (expected future) financial mechanisms allowing for recov-
ering the R&D expenses. These financial mechanisms are related to the expected
utilization of the new technologies, which is defined by the insurance system. The
second argument defines the present technological situation as a proxy for past
R&D effort and determines the demand for health care insurance. In this respect,
Weisbrod and LaMay (1999) elaborate on the increased uncertainty surrounding
the R&D decision process, as private and public insurance decisions on the use of
and payment for health care technology are under tighter control from the pressures
for cost containment.
In studying the sources of increasing health care expenditures, Fox et al. (1993)
point out three elements in the case of the United States. These are the view of
health insurance as a tax subsidy, the presence of entry barriers into the medical
profession, and the lack of competition in the insurance industry. Also, Chou and
Liu (2000) look at Taiwan’s National Health Insurance program to find evidence
of causality from third party payment mechanism inducing higher patient volume
that in turn, leads hospitals’ adoption of new technologies.
Cutler et al. (1998) go into the debate of the impact of the increase in health
care expenditures on health outcomes. In front of positions illustrated by Fuchs
(1974) or Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group (1993) where the main
conclusion is that medical care has little impact on health outcomes, Cutler et al.
(1998) argue that in a “dynamic context, the evidence that the marginal value of
medical care at a point in time is low does not imply that the average value of med-
ical technology changes over several decades is low. To measure cost-of-living
indexes accurately, however, one needs to know the average value of medical tech-
nology changes.” (p. 133). So far there is no general agreement on how to con-
struct such indexes. On the one hand, hedonic prices are difficult to apply given
the widespread regulation of prices; on the other hand, there is no agreement on
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how to set up a model of medical decision-making. Without such indexes, Cutler
et al. (1998) argue that no complete answer can be given to the question of the
consequences of the increase of health care expenditures on the health status of the
population.
In a somewhat similar perspective, Newhouse (1992) also calls for dynamic
arguments to analyse the impact of the increasing costs of medical care when
evaluating the welfare losses at a point in time as compared with those that may
arise due to the increases of expenditures over time. “However, I will contend that
economists have been too preoccupied with a one-period model of health care ser-
vices that takes technology as given, and that we need to pay more attention to
technological change.” (p.5).
The most detailed analyses of the benefits vs. costs of medical advances have
been performed on the basis of case studies. To mention some, the TECH team is
exploring whether individuals living in countries that rapidly adopted new revas-
cularization technologies and clot-dissolving drugs are more likely to survive heart
attacks than individuals living in countries that adopted such interventions more
slowly. McClellan and Kessler for the TECH group (1999) show the spread of
health technology in 16 OECD nations with widely divergent health care systems,
using treatment of heart attacks. TECH (2001) update the information and re-
port that technological change has occurred in all 17 countries of the study, but
its diffusion shows very different rates. For intensive procedures, countries can be
classified into three patterns: early start and fast growth; late start/fast growth; and
late start/slow growth. Those differences are attributed to economic and regulatory
incentives in the health care systems.
Duggan and Evans (2005) estimate the impact of medical innovation in the case
of HIV antiretroviral treatments in the period 1993-2003 from a sample of more
than 10,000 Medicaid patients living in California who were diagnosed HIV/AIDS.
The authors evaluate the cost effectiveness of new drugs on spending. They con-
clude that those new drugs yield a three-fold increase in lifetime Medicaid spend-
ing due to their high cost and increase in life expectancy. Despite this, the authors
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conclude that the new treatments were cost effective based on the value of a year
of life.
Cutler and Huckman (2003) study the diffusion of angioplasty in New York
state to address the puzzling feature of many medical innovations that simultane-
ously reduce unit costs and increase total costs. The key elements of their analysis
is the identification of the so-called treatment expansion (the provision of more in-
tensive treatment to patients with low-grade symptoms) and treatment substitution
(the shift of a patient from more- to less-intensive interventions), and the consider-
ation of the costs and benefits of these effects not only at a point in time but also
their change over time.
Bokhari (2008) studies the impact on adoption of cardiac catherization labora-
tories according to HMO market penetration and HMO competition. In a related
line, Baker (2001) analyses HMO market penetration and diffusion of MRI equip-
ment, and Baker and Phibbs (2002) look at HMO market penetration and diffusion
of neonatal intensive care units.
Finally, Cutler and McClellan (2001) look at treatments for heart attack, low
birthweight infants, depression, and cataracts. Taking into account the treatment
substitution and treatment expansion effects, they conclude that the estimated ben-
efit of technological change is much greater than the cost.
The findings advanced in the empirical literature link health care expenditure
and technology diffusion based on a number of factors, including (i) the degree
of substitutability/complementarity between the old and new technologies, (ii) the
efficiency of the innovation in terms of effort reduction and output improvement,
(iii) the impact of expenses of the adoption of new technologies in accordance
with the treatment expansion and treatment substitution effects, (iv) the presence
of agents whose objective functions need not be profit maximization, and (v) the
characteristics of the health care system, its financing and regulation.
These and other elements determine the incentives to develop and diffuse new
medical technologies. However, there are very few theoretical models providing
support to the empirical modeling, and allowing for addressing the incentives for
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technological development, the rate of its diffusion in the health care system, or the
welfare effects of the adoption of such (expensive) medical innovations. Among
those few contributions we find Goddeeris (1984a,b), Baumgardner (1991), and
Selder (2005), who examine the effects of technical innovation on the insurance
market, and Miraldo (2007) who studies the feed-back effects between the health
care and the R&D sectors.
Goddeeris (1984b) develops a framework for analysing the effects of medical
insurance on the direction of technological change in medicine, where research is
carried out by profit maximizing institutions. Goddeeris (1984a) sets up a dynamic
model to look at the welfare effects of the adoption of endogenously supplied in-
novations in medical care financed through medical insurance, using as welfare
criterion the expected utility of the typical individual. Baumgardner (1991) builds
upon Godderis (1984a) and studies the relationship between different types of tech-
nical change, welfare and different types of insurance contracts, to conclude that
the value of a specific development in technology depends on the type of insur-
ance contract. Selder (2005) extends Baumgardner (1991), analysing the incen-
tives of health care providers driven by different reimbursement systems to adopt
new technologies in a world with ex-post moral hazard and their impact on the
rate of diffusion. In particular, he considers a model where “the physician chooses
a technology and offers this technology to the patient. The patient then chooses
the treatment intensity which maximizes his utility given the technology offered.
Taking these actions into account, the insurer (or social planner) designs a remu-
neration scheme for the physician and an insurance contract for the patient. He
cannot contract upon technology choice and treatment intensity” (p. 910). The
welfare implications of the adoption of new technologies are also addressed.
Miraldo (2007) studies the impact of different payment systems on the adop-
tion of endogenously supplied new technologies, by introducing a feed-back effect
from the health care sector into the R&D sector. Her central claim is that “[t]he
diffusion process of existing technologies may feed back into the R&D sector since
the incentives to create new technologies depend on the propensity to apply them”
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(p.2). In turn, the expected profitability of a newly developed technology depends
on the number of hospitals adopting (market size) and the reimbursement associ-
ated with it. R&D activities may be done in either in-house or externally. Both
scenarios are solved for the technologies’ optimal quality and cost decreasing lev-
els and for the decision on optimal reimbursement by a central planner.
There are several relevant topics that we do not address in our analysis. One is
the role of the malpractice system, with extra tests and procedures ordered in re-
sponse to the perceived threat of medical malpractice claims (Kessler and McClel-
lan, 1996). On the effects of hospital competition on health care costs see Kessler
and Mcclellan (2000). Another topic is the use of technology assessment crite-
ria to measure the value of new health care technologies brought about by R&D
investments. Economic evaluation (cost-benefit analysis) of new technologies is
common in pharmaceutical innovation and has led to a wide body of literature,
both on methodological principles and on application to specific products. For a
recent view on the interaction between R&D and health technology assessment
criteria, see Philipson and Jena (2006).
Most of our analysis is set in the context of a health care sector organized
around an NHS. We do not explicitly account for a specific role of the private
sector in the provision of health care services as a driver in the diffusion of new
available technologies. Our analysis is applicable to both private and public sectors
to the extent that they use the payment mechanisms we explore below.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
behavioural assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the adoption decision of a new
technology under the different payment regimes. Section 5 compares the levels
of adoption across payment schemes. Section 6 studies how technology diffuses
across the health care sector. A section with conclusions and a technical appendix
closes the paper.
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2 The model
We consider a semi-altruistic provider, who values financial results (represented by
an increasing and concave utility function, V (·), V ′(·) > 0 and V ′′(·) < 0) and
patients’ health gains. We will refer to the hospital as an example of a relevant
provider throughout the text.
There is a potential total number of patients q∗ in need of treatment. The actual
number of patients treated by the hospital, q, is uncertain over the course of a time
period (say, a year). The hospital can install capacity of a new technology that
allows it to treat q¯ patients. If demand for hospital services exceeds the newly
installed capacity, then patients are treated using an older technology. We assume
that within the set of patients needing treatment no prioritization is made across
patients.1 Uncertainty about demand for hospital services is modeled simply as
distribution F (q), with density f(q), in the domain [0, q∗].
Hospitals receive a payment transfer R. Such payment may be prospective,
retrospective, or mixed. We will analyse two payment systems. On the one hand,
we will study a cost reimbursement scheme flexible enough to accommodate total
cost reimbursement, fixed fee/capitation, and partial cost reimbursement. On the
other hand, we look at the effects of a DRG-based payment system with payments
by sickness episode.
The new technology has a cost per unit of capacity built of p (a unit allows to
treat one patient).2 There is also a constant marginal cost per patient treated, given
by θ in the new technology and by c in the old technology. We assume that the
total average/marginal cost of the new technology is higher than the corresponding
average/marginal cost of the old technology.
Assumption 1.
p+ θ − c > 0. (1)
1This is assumed for expositional simplicity. The problem remains basically the same within each
priority group if we allow for explicit prioritization of patients.
2This means that for the purposes of our main arguments we abstract from the potential lumpiness
of technological investment. Lumpiness can be easily accommodated by redefining the units of
measurement of patients.
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With this assumption we capture the generally accepted claim that new tech-
nologies are not cost savers relative to existing ones and are one of the main drivers
of the cost inflation in the health care sectors in developed countries.
Patient benefits measured in monetary units are given by b under the new tech-
nology and by bˆ in the old technology. We assume b > bˆ, b > p+ θ and bˆ > c, so
that it is socially desirable to provide treatment to patients.
Economic evaluation criteria will often require that incremental benefits from
the new technology exceed incremental costs, that is
Assumption 2. Economic evaluation criterion for approval of new technology re-
quires incremental benefits greater than incremental costs from the new technology.
That is,
∆ = b− bˆ > p+ θ − c > 0 (2)
Later on, we will allow this requisite for formal adoption of new technologies
to play a role. For the time being, this condition is not imposed. Hereinafter,
whenever we mention that economic evaluation criteria (or health technology as-
sessment) is used, we mean that incremental benefits are greater than incremental
costs (or equivalently Assumption 2 holds).
The expected welfare for the hospital decision maker is given by the valuation
of the financial results of the hospital and by valuation of patients’ benefits from
treatment.
W =
∫ q¯
0
V (R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
V (R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
+
∫ q¯
0
bqf(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(
(q − q¯)bˆ+ q¯b
)
f(q)dq (3)
The financial result of the hospital is given by revenues R (that will follow
a pre-specified rule), minus the costs of treating patients. Costs of the hospital
have two components. First, the cost of building capacity q¯. This is given by
pq¯, regardless of whether demand exceeds or not, the capacity level of the new
technology. Second, there is the cost of actual treatments when realized demand
is below the capacity built for the new technology. This cost is θq. On the other
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hand, when realized demand is above the capacity available for treatment under
the new technology, q¯ patients are treated with the new technology at marginal cost
θ, and (q − q¯) patients are treated under the old technology with marginal cost
c. Financial results are assessed by the hospital with a utility function V . This
valuation of financial results corresponds to the first line of equation (3).
The other element of the welfare function of the hospital is made up of benefits
to patients. These are b and bˆ in the event of treatment under the new and old
technology respectively. When realized demand is below the capacity level of the
new technology, then utility bq is generated for each level of realized demand. In
the case of realized demand above the capacity level for the new technology, q¯
patients have utility b and (q − q¯) patients have utility bˆ. The expected utility over
all possible levels of realized demand is the second line of equation (3). Note also
that in the computation on the expected welfare we are summing over probabilities,
not over patients.
The (adoption) decision problem of the hospital is to choose its capacity un-
der the new technology q¯. Naturally, such decision is contingent on the system of
reimbursement to the hospital. We will study and compare a (partial) cost reim-
bursement system and a DRG payment system.3
3 Technology adoption under cost reimbursement
Let us assume that the hospital is reimbursed according to the cost of treating pa-
tients. We want to characterize the optimal choice of q¯ by the hospital decision
maker, taken as given the payment system.
The total cost depends on the level of realized demand and is defined as the
fixed cost of investment in the new technology (pq¯) and the variable cost given by
the population of patients treated. We have to distinguish two situations accord-
ing to whether or not demand is in excess of the capacity provided by the new
technology (q¯). Implicitly, we assume that the new technology is used until capac-
3Abbey (2009) presents a general appraisal of health care payment systems. See also Culyer and
Newhouse (2000).
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ity is exhausted. If there is demand left to serve, patients are treated with the old
technology. Formally, the total cost function of the hospital is given by,
TC =
{
pq¯ + θq if q ≤ q¯
pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯) if q > q¯ (4)
A cost reimbursement system that the transfer to the hospital is composed of a fixed
part and a cost sharing part β ∈ [0, 1].
R = α+ βTC (5)
Note incidentally, that by setting β = 0 we obtain a capitation system where only
a fixed amount is transferred to the hospital regardless of the costs actually borne
with treatment of patients.
Substituting (5) into (3) the hospital’s welfare function becomes
W = b
∫ q¯
0
qf(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(
(q − q¯)bˆ+ q¯b
)
f(q)dq
+
∫ q¯
0
V
(
α− (1− β)(pq¯ + θq)
)
f(q)dq
+
∫ q∗
q¯
V
(
α− (1− β)(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯))
)
f(q)dq (6)
The problem of the hospital is to identify the value of q¯ maximizing (6). To
ease the reading of the mathematical expressions, let us introduce the following
notation:
∆ ≡ b− bˆ
R1(q) ≡ α− (1− β)(pq¯ + θq)
R2(q) ≡ α− (1− β)(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯))
Proposition 1. Under a cost reimbursement system, full adoption is never optimal
for the provider. Patient benefits above a threshold ensure positive adoption for
every level of reimbursement the payment system may define.
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Proof. The optimal level of adoption q¯ is the solution of first-order condition of
the optimization problem (6). That is, the solution of,
∂W
∂q¯
= ∆
∫ q∗
q¯
f(q)dq − (1− β)p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R1(q))f(q)dq
− (1− β)(p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R2(q))f(q)dq = 0. (7)
Note that for q¯ → q∗, the first-order condition (7) is negative. Therefore, the
value q¯ solving (7) must be below q∗. Next, take q¯ = 0. Then, ∆ − (1 − β)(p +
θ − c) ∫ q∗0 V ′(R2(q))f(q)dq > 0 for β sufficiently high. Or equivalently, for each
β there is a critical ∆ such that q¯ > 0.
To gain insight into the content of this proposition note that the first term in (7)
represents the marginal gain from treating one additional patient with the new tech-
nology when the realized demand is greater than q¯. The other terms represent the
marginal cost of treating an extra patient with the new technology. To obtain an
explicit solution to the optimal level of technology adoption, some further assump-
tions are required.
Assume now risk neutrality (V ′(·) = 1), and a uniform distribution. Also
normalize q∗ = 1 without loss of generality. Then, the first-order condition (7)
reduces to
∆(1− q¯)− (1− β)pq¯ − (1− β)(p+ θ − c)(1− q¯) = 0,
or
q¯ =
(
1− p(1− β)
∆− (1− β)(θ − c)
)
. (8)
Second-order condition guarantees that the denominator of the fraction is positive.
Remark 1. Patients’ benefits are a necessary condition for adoption given the
assumption of no cost savings in treatment with the new technology and both
technologies being reimbursed in the same way (β). In other words, given that
p + θ − c > 0, if ∆ = 0, the first order condition (7) is always negative and
accordingly q¯ = 0.
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Note that, in general, we cannot state whether, or not, passing a health tech-
nology assessment criterion (assumption 2) is restrictive over the desired adoption
level by health care providers.
Under risk neutrality and uniform distribution, the use of economic evaluation
criteria implies that adoption desired by the provider occurs more often, as long as
β < 1.4
3.1 Cost-sharing and optimal technology adoption
We are interested in assessing how adoption changes with the level of cost reim-
bursement. In other words, we want to study the impacts of a variation of β and α
on the level of adoption. This will give us the intuition of the role of the parameters
of the payment system (α and β) in determining the optimal level of technology
adoption.
Let us thus compute,
∂2W
∂q¯∂β
= p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R1(q))f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R2(q))f(q)dq
− (1− β)
[
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R1(q))(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq+
(p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R2(q))(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
]
(9)
Given the concavity of V (·) and using (1), it follows that increasing cost sharing
leads to more adoption, because a higher fraction of the cost is automatically cov-
ered. The sign of expression (9) is sufficient to sign the effect of interest, dq¯/dβ,
which will carry the same sign.
In a similar fashion, we study the impact of a variation of α by computing,
∂2W
∂q¯∂α
= −(1−β)
(
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R1(q))f(q)dq+(p+θ−c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R2(q))f(q)dq
)
(10)
Given the concavity of V (·) and using (1), it follows that this expression is positive.
Higher values of α mean lower marginal cost of investing more in terms of utility.
Thus, for the same benefit more investment will result. As before, the sign of
4This can be seen from direct inspection of equation (8) against Assumption 2.
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dq¯/dα is the same as the sign of expression (10). A special case occurs under risk
neutrality.
Remark 2. Under risk neutrality, the level of technology adoption is insensitive
to α. Therefore, the only instrument of the payment system to affect technology
adoption is the share of cost reimbursement.
Given that α monetary units are transferred regardless of the activity of the
hospital, under risk neutrality it should not be surprising that the level of technology
adoption will be linked exclusively to the (expected) number of patients treated
with the new technology, as it is the only way to improve the welfare obtained by
the hospital.
3.2 Further comparative statics
The previous comparative statics exercise, although informative, was incomplete.
In a way it says that in general, higher transfers lead to higher levels of technology
adoption by the hospital, because of the increased patients’ benefits. Next, we want
to complete the study of the comparative static properties of the optimal technology
adoption decision. In particular, the impact on the optimal technology adoption
of redefining the parameters of the payment system, keeping expected payment
constant or expected hospital surplus constant. In this way, we have a well-defined
reference point to base the study of the impact of a variation of the parameters of
the payment function.
3.2.1 Constant expected payment
Consider keeping payment constant in expected terms, that is, dR = 0. Recall-
ing (4) and (5), the expression of the monetary transfer to the hospital is given
by,
R = α+ β
(∫ q¯
0
(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(pq¯ + θq + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
,
Assuming that the payment to the hospital remains constant after adjusting the
parameters (α, β) of the payment function, a policy change in parameters will
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satisfy
dR =dα+ dβ
(∫ q¯
0
(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(pq¯ + θq + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
+ β
(
p
∫ q¯
0
f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
f(q)dq
)
dq¯ = 0. (11)
Finally, let us recall the first-order condition (7) characterizing the optimal value
of q¯. Total differentiation yields
∂2W
∂q¯2
dq¯ +
(
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R1(q))f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R2(q))f(q)dq
− (1− β)
(
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R1(q))(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq
+ (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R2(q))(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
dβ
− (1− β)
(
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R1(q))f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R2(q))f(q)dq
)
dα = 0
(12)
Thus, we have a system of equations given by (11) and (12), that we can write
in a compact form as
dα+ Γdq¯ + Λdβ = 0
Φdα−Ψdq¯ + Υdβ = 0. (13)
where we use the following notation:
Γ ≡β
(
p
∫ q¯
0
f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
f(q)dq
)
> 0
Λ ≡
∫ q¯
0
(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(pq¯ + θq + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq > 0
Φ ≡− (1− β)
(
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R1(q))f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R2(q))f(q)dq
)
> 0
Ψ ≡− ∂
2W
∂q¯2
> 0
Υ ≡p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R1(q))f(q)dq + (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R2(q))f(q)dq
− (1− β)
(
p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R1(q))(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq
+ (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R2(q))(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
> 0
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To obtain some clear intuition of the content of the system (12) let us simplify
the analysis by assuming risk neutrality. Then, the system (13) becomes,
dα+ Γdq¯ + Λdβ = 0 (14)
−Ψ′dq¯ + Υ′dβ = 0. (15)
where Ψ
′
and Υ
′
represent the corresponding values Ψ and Υ when V
′′
(·) = 0.
Note that equation (15) tells us that dq¯/dβ > 0, and equation (14) tells us that α
adjusts accordingly to satisfy the equation. Therefore,5
Remark 3. Under risk neutrality, moving to more cost reimbursement always in-
creases adoption, even if (expected) payment is kept constant overall. Risk aversion
leads to ambiguity of how the level of adoption adjusts to changes in the payment
system.
We can examine the ambiguity induced by the presence of risk aversion. The
solution of the system (13) is given by
dq¯
dβ
=
Υ− ΛΦ
Ψ + ΓΦ
and
dq¯
dα
= − Υ− ΛΦ
ΛΨ + ΓΥ
(16)
Note that the numerators in (16) have an ambiguous sign, or alternatively it is
positive iff ΥΨ > Λ, where risk aversion appears only in the terms of the fraction.
Therefore, an increase in the cost sharing (β) will induce more adoption if the prop-
erties of the utility function V (·) function are such that the ratio Υ/Ψ is above the
threshold given by Λ). The properties of the utility function V (·) will vary across
hospitals. Therefore, identifying them is an empirical exercise. This is precisely
the issue behind the difficulties to interpret the empirical work on technological
adoption as a function of the payment system.
To assess the impact on welfare, while maintaining dR = 0, let us compute
dW =
∂W
∂R
dR+
∂W
∂q¯
dq¯ (17)
The first term of (17) is zero because we are evaluating the impact on welfare at
dR = 0. The second term is also zero from the envelope theorem. Accordingly,
dW = 0.
5The last part of the remark is proved in the appendix.
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The intuition under risk aversion follows the same lines of reasoning as before.
The hospital only improves its welfare through patients’ benefits. Then, any in-
crease in the cost sharing favours adoption because the new technology improves
patients’ benefits. Given that total payment remains constant, the increase in cost
sharing is adjusted through a lower α to satisfy the restriction, thus offsetting the
gain of welfare.
Remark 4. Keeping the expected payment constant implies no change in the ob-
jective function when changing the parameters of the cost reimbursement system.
Remark 3 and remark 4 together tell us that a move toward more reimbursement
leads to more adoption. Thus, the extra benefits to patients are compensated with
a lower surplus for the hospital to maintain the objective function constant.
3.2.2 Constant hospital surplus
Let us assess the comparative statics while maintaining the expected surplus of the
hospital constant. Denote such surplus as S. It is defined as,
S = α− (1− β)
(∫ q¯
0
(pq¯+ θq)f(q)dq+
∫ q∗
q¯
(pq¯+ θq¯+ c(q− q¯)f(q)dq
)
. (18)
Totally differentiating (18) allows us to introduce the restriction of keeping the
hospital surplus constant as,
dS = dα− (1− β)
(
p+ (θ − c)(1− F (q¯))
)
dq¯+(∫ q¯
0
(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯)f(q)dq
)
dβ = 0
(19)
As before, we have a system of two equations given by (12) and (19), which in
compact form are
Φdα−Ψdq¯ + Υdβ = 0
dα+ Ωdq¯ + Πdβ = 0 (20)
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where we use the following notation:
Ω ≡ −(1− β)
(
p+ (θ − c)(1− F (q¯))
)
Π ≡
∫ q¯
0
(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯)f(q)dq
Imposing risk neutrality to better assess its content, the system (20) simplifies to,
−Ψdq¯ + Υ′dβ = 0
dα+ Ωdq¯ + Πdβ = 0 (21)
so that dq¯/dβ > 0, but the sign of dα/dβ is ambiguous.
Finally, note that
dW =
(∫ q¯
0
V ′(R1(q))f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R2(q))f(q)dq
)
dα+
(∫ q¯
0
V ′(R1(q))(pq¯ + θq)f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R2(q))(pq¯ + θq¯ + c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
dβ
(22)
Assume under risk neutrality that V ′(·) = 1 without loss of generality. Then,
substituting (19) in (22), it follows that dW > 0. Accordingly,
Remark 5. Under risk neutrality and constant trade-off of surplus against patient
benefits, an increase in the cost reimbursement adjusted in a way that total expected
surplus of the hospital remains constant, results in an increase in the objective
function. This comes from patients’ benefits due to more adoption and given the
absence of costs to raising money for the payment to be made.
4 Technology adoption under DRG payment
A DRG payment system means that a fixed amount is paid for every type of dis-
ease. We are considering a single-disease model, where two technologies are avail-
able. We will distinguish two approaches. The first one pays the hospital the same
amount regardless of the technology used. It corresponds to a situation where each
patient treated is an episode originating a payment through a given DRG and tech-
nology adoption will keep the DRG. Hence the payment received by the hospital
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remains constant. The second approach will condition the level of reimbursement
upon the choice of technology to provide treatment. It is interpreted as a situa-
tion where adoption of technology leads to the coding of the sickness episode in a
different DRG, receiving a different payment.
4.1 Homogeneous DRG reimbursement
Let us consider first that the adoption of a new technology does not convey a vari-
ation in the DRG classification. Then, the payment received by the hospital for
patients treated is defined as,
R = Kq. (23)
Substituting (23) into (3) the hospital’s welfare function becomes,
W = U(b)
∫ q¯
0
qf(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(
(q − q¯)U(bˆ) + q¯U(b)
)
f(q)dq
+
∫ q¯
0
V
(
Kq − pq¯ − θq
)
f(q)dq
+
∫ q∗
q¯
V
(
Kq − pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯)
)
f(q)dq (24)
Let us define the reimbursement received when the capacity installed of the new
technology can cover all the demand (R3(q)), and when there is excess demand so
that a fraction of the patients are treated with the old technology (R4(q)) as,
R3(q) ≡ Kq − pq¯ − θq
R4(q) ≡ Kq − pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯)
Proposition 2. Under homogeneous DRG payment system, full adoption is never
optimal.
Proof. The optimal level of adoption is given as before, by the solution of the
first-order condition,
∂W
∂q¯
= ∆
∫ q∗
q¯
f(q)dq +
(
V (R3(q¯))− V (R4(q¯))
)
f(q¯)
− p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R3(q))f(q)dq − (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R4(q))f(q)dq = 0. (25)
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For q¯ → q∗, the first-order condition (25) is negative. Thus, the optimal value
satisfying (25) must be less than q∗.
Remark 6. Note that sufficiently large patients’ benefits are necessary for the first-
order condition (25) to have an interior solution. Otherwise, the hospital optimally
does not adopt the new technology.
Let us consider a simplified version of the model by assuming risk neutrality,
a uniform distribution, and without loss of generality q∗ = 1. Then, the first-order
condition (25) reduces to,
∆(1− q¯)− pq¯ − (p+ θ − c)(1− q¯) = 0 (26)
This simplified version of the model allows us to obtain an explicit solution of the
optimal level of technical adoption. It is given by,
q¯ =
(
1− p
∆− θ + c
)
. (27)
The denominator of equation (27) is positive from the second-order condition.
Clearly, q¯ < 1. Finally, the optimal value of adoption given by (27) trades off
patients’ benefits and the differential marginal cost of the two technologies.
Now, under the DRG payment systems, adoption by the health care provider
occurs if and only if the economic evaluation criterion is satisfied (compare equa-
tion (27) with Assumption 2).
Next, we look at the comparative statics analysis of the impact of the level of
reimbursement K on adoption. It follows from,
∂2W
∂q¯∂K
= −p
∫ q¯
0
V ′′(R3(q))qf(q)dq − (p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′′(R4(q))qf(q)dq > 0
Given the concavity of V (·) and recalling that p + θ − c > 0, it follows that this
derivative is positive. Therefore, higher DRG payment means that in utility terms
there is lower marginal cost of investment, and thus there is more investment in
capacity.
Remark 7. Risk aversion is a necessary condition for the DRG payment being
able to affect the level of adoption.
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4.2 Heterogeneous DRG reimbursement
Assume now that the hospital is reimbursed conditionally upon the technology
used in the treatments. This makes sense as long as the costs of the new and
old technologies are sufficiently disperse so that each treatment falls in a different
DRG, which typically elicits a different payment. With this framework in mind, let
us define
R5(q) ≡ K1q − pq¯ − θq
R6(q) ≡ K1q¯ +K2(q − q¯)− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯)
whereK1 is the payment associated with treating a patient with the new technology
and K2 is the payment associated with treating a patient with the old technology.
Note that K1 must be greater than K2. Otherwise, hospitals would not even con-
sider the possibility of investing in the new technology.
Note that we can rewriteR6(q) as q¯(K1−K2−p−θ+c)+q(K2−c). We assume
that the margin the hospital obtains with the new technology, (K1−p−θ), is larger
than the margin that it obtains with the old technology, (K2 − c), or equivalently,
Assumption 3.
K1 −K2 − (p+ θ − c) > 0.
This assumption is necessary for adoption to occur. Otherwise, the hospital
would have no incentive whatsoever to invest in the adoption of the new technol-
ogy.
Now the utility function of the hospital is given by,
W = b
∫ q¯
0
qf(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
(
(q − q¯)bˆ+ q¯b
)
f(q)dq
+
∫ q¯
0
V (R5(q))f(q)dq +
∫ q∗
q¯
V (R6(q))f(q)dq (28)
Proposition 3. Under a heterogeneous DRG payment system, full adoption is
never optimal. Under Assumption 3, a positive adoption level exists even in the
absence of positive patient benefits.
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Proof. The first-order condition characterizing the optimal level of adoption is
∂W
∂q¯
= ∆
∫ q∗
q¯
f(q)dq + V (R5(q¯))f(q¯)− V (R6(q¯))f(q¯)
− p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R5(q))f(q)dq
+ (K1 −K2 − p− θ + c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R6(q))f(q)dq = 0. (29)
For q¯ → q∗, the first-order condition (29) is negative. Thus, the optimal value
satisfying (25) must be less than q∗.
To gain some intuition of the level of adoption, assume risk neutrality, and a
uniform distribution once again. Also, without loss of generality, normalize q∗ =
1. Then, expression (29) reduces to,
∆(1− q¯)− pq¯ + (K1 −K2 − p− θ + c)(1− q¯) = 0,
so that,
q¯ =
(
1− p
∆ +K1 −K2 − θ + c
)
. (30)
and second-order conditions guarantee that the denominator of the fraction is pos-
itive. Note that q¯ < 1. The optimal value of q¯ given by (30) reflects the trade-off
between incurring an idle capacity cost for high q¯ and getting a better margin, i.e.
K1−(p+θ) > K2−c. Furthermore, the benefits of the patients are not a necessary
condition for technology adoption as long as the new technology is reimbursed suf-
ficiently higher than the old technology (K1 > K2) (in other words, as long as the
new technology leads to a higher margin from payment). Adding patients’ benefits
naturally raises adoption rates.
In this case, technology adoption by the health care provider will always be
greater than implied by application of the health technology assessment. That is,
in cases where economic evaluation indicates no adoption of the new technology
(∆ < p + θ − c), the health care provider does prefer a strictly positive level of
technology adoption.
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5 Comparing payment regimes
We have presented the adoption decision under two payment regimes, cost reim-
bursement, and DRG payments. The respective optimal levels are difficult to com-
pare. The very particular scenario of risk neutrality (under the form of V ′(·) = 1)
and uniform distribution allows us to obtain some intuition on the relative impact
of each of the payment systems on the level of adoption.
Let us recall the expressions for the respective levels of adoption under cost
reimbursement and DRG payment systems, given by (8) and (30) respectively, and
let λ ≡ K1 −K2:
q¯cr =
(
1− p(1− β)
∆− (1− β)(θ − c)
)
,
q¯drghom =
(
1− p
∆− (θ − c)
)
,
q¯dgrhet =
(
1− p
∆ + λ− (θ − c)
)
.
The difference in adoption levels is given by:
q¯drghom − q¯dgrhet = p
( 1
∆ + λ− (θ − c) −
1
∆− (θ − c)
)
< 0, (31)
q¯cr − q¯drghet = p
( 1
∆ + λ− (θ − c) −
1
∆
1−β − (θ − c)
)
, (32)
q¯cr − q¯drghom = p
( 1
∆− (θ − c) −
1
∆
1−β − (θ − c)
)
> 0 (33)
Comparison between the adoption levels across DRG regimes is clear cut. Un-
der heterogeneous DRG reimbursement the optimal level of technical adoption is
greater than under homogeneous DRG reimbursement. This is not surprising. The
hospital has more incentive to invest in the new technology when the payment as-
sociated with it is larger than the payment for the old technology.
The comparison of technology adoption under cost reimbursement and under a
DRG payment system with a new DRG to pay for the new technology is less clear
cut.
To interpret expression (32), suppose the provider decides to invest an amount
p in the new technology under the DRG system. Such investment generates one
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βλ
∆
10
λ = ∆
β
1− β
CR
adopts more
DRG
adopts more
↑ ∆
Figure 1: Optimal adoption: CR vs. heterogenous DRG.
extra unit of capacity of the new technology. The benefits to the provider in our
setting under additive utility and risk neutrality, are the gain in patients’ benefits
(∆), plus the extra revenues associated with the new technology (K1−K2), minus
the marginal cost increase of treating one extra patient with the new technology
(θ− c), whenever the additional capacity is used. Summarizing the net gains to the
provider of an additional unit of the new technology under a heterogenous DRG
reimbursement scheme are ∆ +K1−K2− (θ− c). This is the denominator of the
left-hand fraction in (32).
Consider now the same investment under the cost reimbursement payment sys-
tem. Since the provider knows that it will obtain a reimbursement β, from its
perspective spending p from its free financial resources yields 1/1 − β units of
capacity for treatment with the new technology. Each of these additional units
generate patients’ benefits (∆), and an operating marginal cost change of (1 −
β)(θ − c). Summarizing, the investment of p monetary units results in a return
of (1/1 − β)(∆ − (1 − β)(θ − c)). This corresponds to the denominator of the
right-hand fraction in (32).
We represent this comparison in Figure 1. The dividing line represents the
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locus of (λ, β) values yielding the same marginal return of investment in new ca-
pacity to the provider across regimes. The areas to the right and left of this line
indicate the parameter configurations yielding more technology adoption under the
payment scheme generating higher marginal net benefits to the provider.
A similar argument can be put forward to analyse expression (33). The net
gains to the provider of an additional unit of the new technology under a homoge-
nous DRG reimbursement scheme are ∆− (θ− c). This is the denominator of the
left-hand fraction in (33). Under cost reimbursement, the investment of pmonetary
units results in a return of (1/1− β)(∆− (1− β)(θ− c)). This corresponds to the
denominator of the right-hand fraction in (33). The return of the investment is thus
larger under cost reimbursement, yielding the higher level of adoption.
6 The diffusion of technology
We can link our model to existing literature on technological diffusion. Consider
as a reference point the well-known “epidemic” model, and assume information on
the existence of the new technology follows a word of mouth diffusion process in
which the main source of information is previous users.6
LetN be the total number of hospitals, and letM(t) be the number of hospitals
that have adopted the new technology up to time period t. Assume that each of the
present users contacts a non-user with probability φ. The probability of contacting
one of the (N −M(t)) non-users is βM(t), so that the number of new adopters
over an interval dt increases in dM(t) = φM(t)(N −M(t))dt. Assume that at
t = 0 there are M(0) users of the new technology, so that the initial adoption rate
η is given by η = (N −M(0))/M(0). Taking the limit as dt→ 0 and solving for
M(t) we obtain,
M(t) =
N
1 + η exp[−φNt]
Next we propose to link our results on adoption to the diffusion process just
presented. To do so, we endogenize the “infection” rate φ by assuming it to be
6Our purpose in this section is mainly illustrative. Thus we neglect here both the weaknesses
of this approach and the alternatives proposed to overcome them. See Geroski (2000) for a non-
technical introduction.
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determined by q¯ and φ′(q¯) > 0. The total number of patients using the new tech-
nology is q¯M , while the potential size of adopters, given the extent of installed
capacity is Nq¯. From this expression, the number of adopters at each moment is
given by,
M(t) =
q¯N
1 + η exp[−φ(q¯)Nt] .
This expression allows us to see that variables that increase q¯ will also increase
the total number of patients treated under the new technology and the diffusion
speed. Thus, the way payment systems influence q¯ translates into an impact on the
speed of diffusion carrying the same sign. This implication is relevant for empirical
works looking at the speed and level of diffusion of new technologies.
7 Final remarks
Adoption of new technologies is usually considered a main driver of growth of
health care costs.7. Many discussions about it exist. Arguments in favour of cost-
benefit analysis (health technology assessment) before the introduction of new
technologies has made its way into policy. We now observe in many countries
the requirement of an “economic test” before payment for new technologies is ac-
cepted by third-party payers (either public or private). This is especially visible
in the case of new pharmaceutical products and it has a growing trend in medical
devices.
However, there is a paucity of theoretical work related to the determinants of
adoption and diffusion of new technologies. We contribute toward filling this gap.
Our model allows for an integrated treatment of incentives for adoption of new
technology. We identify conditions for adoption under two different payment sys-
tems. Also, we compare technology adoption across reimbursement systems in a
simplified set-up. We now summarize the main results.
Under a cost reimbursement system, large enough patient benefits are required
for adoption to occur. As long as patient benefits are above a certain threshold,
adoption of the new technology always occurs at strictly positive levels. The
7See Smith et al. (2009) for a recent account
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threshold is given, in the case of risk neutrality and uniform distribution for pa-
tient benefits, by the cost of treating a patient under the new technology accounting
for the savings resulting from not treating him under the old technology. The cost
reimbursement allows for the extreme cases of full cost reimbursement and capita-
tion (a fixed fee is paid, regardless of actual costs).
The other payment system we considered was prospective payments on a sick-
ness episode basis (the DRG system). Two different regimes can be envisaged
regarding the impact of using a new technology in the payment received by the
provider. In the first one, the treatment performed with the new technology is clas-
sified into the same DRG (and payment made by the third-party payer) as the old
technology. The second possibility is that the new technology leads to a payment
in a different DRG. When the DRG is not adjusted by the use of a new technol-
ogy, patients’ benefits are necessary to induce adoption. Whenever the DRG for
payment of the new technology has a higher price, adoption may occur even in the
absence of patients’ benefits. However in that case, the margin gained with the new
DRG associated with treatment must be sufficiently high to compensate the cost of
adoption.
The role of patient benefits is a crucial one. The desired levels of technology
adoption of health care providers can be compared with the implications of re-
quiring technology adoption to pass a health technology assessment (incremental
benefit above incremental cost). Except for the case of a new technology being
paid in the same DRG of the old technology, private adoption levels are always
higher than allowed by this criterion. This holds the testable prediction that health
care providers will always find, in the other payment systems, regulation imposing
health technology assessments to be actively constraining their decisions. Thus,
they will voice the complaint that regulation reduces their desired level of adop-
tion.
Under parameters for the payment systems in which adoption always occurs,
cost reimbursement leads to greater adoption of the new technology if the rate of
reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old DRG. A larger patient
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benefit favours more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, pro-
vided adoption occurs initially under both payment systems (that is, in the case of
uniform distribution of demand and risk neutrality, when patient benefits from the
new technology are positive).
Our model and results are the first to theoretically address the role of payment
systems in the adoption of new technologies. The results obtained are to be used
to interpret empirical evidence that addresses speed of diffusion of new technolo-
gies and payment systems. Some caveats are worth pointing out. First, we take a
relationship between the provider and the third-party payer to take place without
influence from other forces. In particular, there is no role for competition between
hospitals in our model. Second, capacity building in the new technology is per-
fectly lumpy. It is invested once and it cannot be adjusted further within the same
time frame of uncertain demand.
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Appendix
The first-order condition for the hospital is given by,
∂W
∂q¯
= f(q¯)4 U(b)− p
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq
−(p+ θ − c)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq = 0.
(34)
To obtain the impact of the policy change on technology adoption (that is, on q¯),
we totally differentiate (34) with respect to q¯, p, and θ, and impose dθ = −λdp,
where λ = q¯/
∫ q¯
0 qf(q)dq.
Total differentiation of the first-order condition yields,
∂2W
∂q¯2
dq¯ −
(∫ q¯
0
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq
)
dp
+
(
pq¯
∫ q¯
0
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq
)
dp
+
((
pq¯
∫ q¯
0
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dqθ
−
(∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
dp
+
(
(p+ θ − c)q¯
∫ q∗
q¯
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
dp
−
(∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
dθ
+
(
(p+ θ − c)q¯
∫ q∗
q¯
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
)
dθ = 0
(35)
Substituting dθ = λdp and collecting terms we can rewrite (35) as
∂2W
∂q¯2
dq¯ =
[∫ q¯
0
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq
]
dp
−
[
pq¯
∫ q¯
0
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq − p
∫ q¯
0
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq)qf(q)dqλ
]
dp
+
[
(1− λ)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
]
dp
+
[
(λ− 1)q¯(p+ θ − c)q¯
∫ q∗
q¯
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
]
dp,
(36)
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and further collecting terms, equation (36) becomes,
∂2W
∂q¯2
dq¯ =
[∫ q¯
0
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq
]
dp
−
[
pq¯
∫ q¯
0
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq)
(
1− q∫ q¯
0 qf(q)dq
)
f(q)dq
]
dp
+
[
(1− λ)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
]
dp
+
[
(λ− 1)q¯(p+ θ − c)q¯
∫ q∗
q¯
V
′′
(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
]
dp
(37)
The first two terms in square brackets in the right-hand side are positive, while
the third and fourth terms have negative signs. Therefore the impact on q¯ will be
ambiguous.
This can be made clearer in the special case of risk neutrality, that is V ′ = 1 and
V
′′
= 0. Then hospital decision makers care about expected profits from hospital
activity and patient health gains. Under these assumptions, the right-hand side of
equation (37) can be rewritten as,∫ q¯
0
(R− pq¯ − θq)f(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ q∗
q¯
(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
= R− pq¯ − θ
∫ q∗
q¯
qf(q)dq − (1− λ)
∫ q∗
q¯
c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
− λ
∫ q∗
q¯
(R− pq¯ − θq¯)f(q)dq − θ
∫ q∗
q¯
q¯f(q)dq
= R− pq¯ − θ
∫ q∗
q¯
qf(q)dq + (λ− 1)
∫ q∗
q¯
c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
− q¯∫ q¯
0 qf(q)dq
(1− F (q¯))(R− pq¯ − θq¯)
= (λ− 1)
∫ q∗
q¯
c(q − q¯))f(q)dq + (R− pq¯)
(
1− F (q¯))λ
)
+ θ
(
λq¯ −
∫ q¯
0
qf(q)dq
)
= (λ− 1)
∫ q∗
q¯
c(q − q¯))f(q)dq + θ(λ2 − 1)
∫ q¯
0
qf(q)dq + (R− pq¯)(1− λ(1− F (q¯))).
(38)
The first two terms of equation (38) are positive, whilst the last one is positive if
1 > λ(1− F (q¯)). This occurs for a high value of q¯.
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To better assess the meaning of this result, assume 1 > λ(1 − F (q¯)). Then it
follows that,
dq¯
dp
∣∣∣
dE(pi)=0
> 0.
In this case, a decrease in the price of capacity, at the cost of increasing the price
of consumables does result in a smaller adoption level (and consequently a lower
diffusion rate) of the new technology. This result holds for a sufficiently high value
of q¯ in equilibrium.
Also, q¯ will be higher when benefits to patients are higher. Thus, for tech-
nologies that would lead to extensive use on patients, the move toward a lower
capacity price retards diffusion in anticipation of the high costs associated with
consumables.8
To address the welfare effect to the hospital, the impact on the utility of the
decision maker, by application of the envelope theorem, is given by
dW
dp
∣∣∣
dE(pi)=0
=
∫ q¯
0
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq)[−q¯dp+ qλdp]f(q)dq
+
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))[−q¯dp+ q¯λdp]f(q)dq.
(39)
Noting that,
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯)) > V ′(R− pq¯ − θq) > V ′(R− pq¯),
expression (39) can be rewritten as
V ′(R− pq¯)
∫ q¯
0
(−q¯ + λq)f(q)dq + (λ− 1)
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq
= V ′(R− pq¯)(1− F (q¯))q¯ + (λ− 1))
∫ q∗
q¯
V ′(R− pq¯ − θq¯ − c(q − q¯))f(q)dq > 0,
(40)
implying
dW
dp
∣∣∣
dE(pi)=0
> 0.
Therefore, in general, the subsidization of equipment has a negative impact on a
hospital’s utility due to the extra costs associated with consumables.
8Note that we are not addressing the optimal pricing policy for the medical equipment company.
This can be seen as the outcome of a previous stage in a larger game.
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